We are currently facing global healthcare crisis that has placed unprecedented stress on healthcare workers as a result of the coronavirus disease 2019. It is imperative that we develop novel tools to assist healthcare workers in dealing with the significant additional stress and trauma that has arisen as a result of the pandemic. Based in research on the effects of immersive environments on mood, a neuroscience research laboratory was rapidly repurposed using commercially available technologies and materials to create a nature-inspired (...) relaxation space. Frontline healthcare workers were invited to book 15-min experiences in the Recharge Room before, during or after their shifts, where they were exposed to the immersive, multisensory experience 496 Recharge Room users completed a short survey about their experience during an unselected, consecutive 14-day period. Average self-reported stress levels prior to entering the Recharge Room were 4.58/6. After a single 15-min experience in the Recharge Room, the average user-reported stress level was significantly reduced 1.85/6. Net Promoter Score for the experience was 99.3%. Recharge Rooms such as those described here produce significant short-term reductions in perceived stress, and users find them highly enjoyable. These rooms may be of general utility in high-stress healthcare environments. (shrink)

PurposeEven low intensity exercise bouts of at least 15 min can improve feelings of energy and reduce systolic blood pressure. However, little is known about the psychological outcomes of briefer exercise bouts, particularly for modes of exercise that are more intense than level walking, and readily available to many working adults. This study assessed the effects of a 4-min bout of stair walking on FOE and feelings of fatigue.MethodsThirty-six young adult participants were randomized to either stair walking or seated control (...) groups. All participants walked on level-ground from a laboratory to a nearby stairwell and were seated for 4 min before beginning their experimental condition. Stair-walking participants walked up and down one flight of 16 stairs at their own pace for 4 min, while control participants remained seated during that time. Participants walked back to the laboratory for post-condition assessments. Measures of blood pressure, heart rate, rated perceived exertion, and the intensity of feelings of mental energy, mental fatigue, physical energy, and physical fatigue were assessed pre-and post-condition. Separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted on change scores for all variables.ResultsThe stair climbing group experienced significant increases in heart rate [F = 13.167, p < 0.001] and RPE [F = 93.844, p < 0.001] that were not observed in the seated control group. Four minutes of self-paced stair climbing resulted in small changes and non-significant differences within and between groups in blood pressure as well as FOE and FOF.ConclusionAlthough a 4-min self-paced exercise bout can convey short-term physiological health benefits, a 4-min bout of self-paced indoor stair walking in a stairwell was insufficient to lower blood pressure or change subjective FOE and fatigue in a sample that exhibited better than typical FOE and FOF at the pre-test. (shrink)

Catholic University Of America, Philosophical Studies, No. 145, Abstract No. 2.

Despite spending more on health care than every other industrialized country, the U.S. ranks 37th in health outcomes. These differences cannot be explained away with differences in age and income, or even with quality of care. And, the rate of growth in health care spending in the U.S. continues to increase. The share of the Gross Domestic Product attributable to health care grew from 9% in 1980 to more than 17% in 2011. Health care costs are projected to account for (...) more than one-fifth of our economy by 2021. Despite spending more and more, the U.S. does not have better health outcomes than other countries. Worse, our increasing spending is largely attributable to preventable conditions. More than 85 cents of every dollar spent on health in the U.S. are spent on the treatment and management of chronic diseases, such as those caused by preventable conditions related to obesity and tobacco use. (shrink)

Despite a recent wave in global recognition of the rights of transgender and gender-diverse populations, referred to in this text by the umbrella label of trans*, international law continues to presume a cisgender binary definition of gender — dismissing the lived realities of trans* individuals throughout the world. This gap in international legal recognition and protection has fundamental implications for health, where trans* persons have been and continue to be subjected to widespread discrimination in health care, longstanding neglect of health (...) needs, and significant violations of bodily autonomy. (shrink)

Vague predicates, those that exhibit borderline cases, pose a persistent problem for philosophers and logicians. Although they are ubiquitous in natural language, when used in a logical context, vague predicates lead to contradiction. This paper will address a question that is intimately related to this problem. Given their inherent imprecision, why do vague predicates arise in the first place? I discuss a variation of the signaling game where the state space is treated as contiguous, i.e., endowed with a metric that (...) captures a similarity relation over states. This added structure is manifested in payoffs that reward approximate coordination between sender and receiver as well as perfect coordination. I evolve these games using a variation of Herrnstein reinforcement learning that better reflects the generalizing learning strategies real-world actors use in situations where states of the world are similar. In these simulations, signaling can develop very quickly, and the signals are vague in much the way ordinary language predicates are vague—they each exclusively apply to certain items, but for some transition period both signals apply to varying degrees. Moreover, I show that under certain parameter values, in particular when state spaces are large and time is limited, learning generalization of this sort yields strategies with higher payoffs than standard Herrnstein reinforcement learning. These models may then help explain why the phenomenon of vagueness arises in natural language: the learning strategies that allow actors to quickly and effectively develop signaling conventions in contiguous state spaces make it unavoidable. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: MOORE AND METAPHYSICS In the course of this book I will make frequent use of the word 'metaphysics'. Indeed I will maintain that that word ...

In a review published in Vol. XVIII, No. I of Philosophical Books (January, 1977), Jenny Teichman remarks that, as most philosophy books are non-original, it is probably a good idea, now and again, to remind readers of the fact. Of dissertations I suspect that her statement is true with interest. Even so, it is still only the foolhardy or the naive and puf.e of heart who will ask, "Then why write them?" I mention Teichman's observation here so as to be (...) able to place this present dissertation with its fellows. But while only rarely will a book be original, and perhaps even less often a dissertation, this state of affairs need not preclude novelty on a more modest scale. At any rate, whatever may be the claims or disclaims to innovation by an author, it is the reader who, in the final analysis, will judge a work a legitimate pretender to innovation (large or small) and also judge the value of the new step. I have given this study its present title because it seems to me that the question of the extent to which the analytical work of G.E. Moore is consistent. with the disposition to realism inherent in his famous defense~~ ~ common sense is an important one in Moore's philosophy an~ perhaps, a question that has received less critical attention than it might have. In addressing that question here I have tried to show that, while Moore's insistence upon the literal truth of certain "views of common sense" does indeed commit him to a realist framework in metaphysical matters, this framework is flexible and allows for considerable, sometimes possibly surprising, freedom in deciding matters of detail. For instance, Moore's tendency, late in his career, to favor a phenomenalist analysis of material-object propositions forcefully compels us to ask the question of just how much a defense of common sense in philosophy commits the defender to. A similar question arises in regard to Moore's treatment of philosophical puzzles associated with the topic of 'abstract entities.' I will argue that, while Moore's work on metaphysical issues can, when collected, be termed 'realist' his concern was never with the correctness of realism as a system of thought, but rather with the soundness of individual arguments. In this kind of attention to the "small print" of philosophical arguments and in his recognition of the many questions of detail which have to be settled before a general position, whether realism or idealism or a third view, can be said to be either set forth or upheld, lies much of Moore's greatness as a philosopher.And, if there is an element of truth in the suggestion that Moore tended betimes not to see woods for trees, at least he never tended not to see trees for woods. And surely the latter is much the greater philosophical failing. (shrink)

In 1942, replying to a criticism put to him by Langford, G. E. Moore confessed that he was unable to solve the paradox of analysis. But while conceding inability to solve the puzzle Moore offered the following suggestion, which he did not further develop: I think that, in order to explain the fact that, even if ‘To be a brother is the same thing as to be a male sibling’ is true, yet nevertheless this statement is not the same as (...) the statement ‘To be a brother is to be a brother’, one must suppose that both statements are in some sense about the expressions used as well as about the concept of being a brother. But in what sense they are about the expressions used I cannot see clearly; and therefore I cannot give any clear solution to the puzzle. (shrink)

This report shares a study that explored the perceptions pre-service teachers have of middle school students. Participants were asked to complete the Adjective Checklist (ACL) by endorsing the words they considered most characteristic of a typical middle school student. Items most frequently endorsed indicated a predominantly negative perception (e.g. ?awkward?, ?confused? and ?emotional?). Implications for pre-service teacher training are discussed.

The current work builds a definition of irritability from both academic definitions and lay perspectives. In Study 1, a quantitative content analysis of academic definitions resulted in eight main content categories (i.e., behaviour, emotion or affect, cognition, physiological, qualifiers, irritant, stability or endurance, and other). In Study 2, a community sample of 39 adults participated in qualitative interviews. A deductive thematic analysis resulted in two main themes. The first main theme dealt with how participants positioned irritability in relation to other (...) negative states. The second dealt with how participants constructed irritability as both a loss of control and as an experience that should be controlled. The discussion integrates the findings of both studies and provides a concise, but comprehensive definition. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some main threads of the identification stage of Scotus's project in the fourth chapter of De Primo, where he tries to show that a first efficient cause must have the attributes of simplicity, intellect, will, and infinity. Many philosophers are favorably disposed towards one or another argument such as Scotus's (e.g., the cosmological argument from contingency) purporting to show that there is an absolutely first efficient cause. How far can Scotus take us from this starting (...) point towards the ultimate aim of establishing the existence of a being more recognizably identifiable as God? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 533 Le Cristologie contemporanee e le loro posizioni fondamentali al vaglio della dottrina di S. Tommaso. By DANIEL 0Ls, O.P., Studi Tomi· stici, 39. Citta Del Vaticano: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1991. Pp. 198 + 13. 25,000 Lire. The author's purpose in this compact but highly informative volume is to confront some of the more fundamental positions of current chris· tology with the christology of Aquinas, with the (...) further intention of deepening our appreciation of St. Thomas's thought (pp. 6 and 193). Ols is aware that, in speaking generically of " contemporary christology," he is entering into discussion with a large number of authors whose viewpoints often differ significantly from one another. He cites writers as diverse as Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Sobrino, and Duquoc, for example. Cognizant of the differences among them, he nonetheless sees points of convergence. There is, he says, a certain " negative unity " among them in that each holds himself at a certain distance from the doctrine of Chalcedon and from the " christology from above " which traditionally has been taken as proceeding from the Chalcedonian defi· nition of faith. (One of the reasons for using St. Thomas as interlocutor with the modern christologies is Aquinas's own development of such a "christology from above.") Along with this negative unity, there is another aspect that links the disparate modern christologies. Ols is aware that, in speaking generically of " contemporary christain anthropological focus which sees as normative " not the revealed message, but the ones to whom the message is directed" (p. 8). In developing his thesis, Ols in fact leaves to one side most of the major modern writers on christology and limits himself to a systematic analysis of the christologies of Rahner (especially as found in Foundations of Christian Faith and in A New Christology, which Rahner wrote with William Thiising) and Schillebeeckx. In five chapters (pp. 15-76) Ols examines the relevant points of the theology of each man and then separately contrasts the results with the theology of Aquinas. The examination of Rahner's thought is done not without a certain sympathy. Ols notes points of convergence between the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and the actual thought of Aquinas. There is a certain a priori methodology in both men, and there are similarities between Rahner's transcendental approach and Thomas's thought on the " natural desire" for the Beatific Vision. The harmonies, however, are often more apparent than real, says Ols; this is especially so in a point central to the Rahnerian anthropology: Rahner's a priori definition of man as the being capable of union with the deity. This capability Rahner equates with the Scholastic notion of potentia obedientalis. In fact, claims Ols, Rahncr is using the terminology in an equivocal sense 534 BOOK REVIEWS and means something quite different from what Aquinas meant by it. For Rahner, the obediential potency "is objectively identical with the essence of man" (p. 30, quoting from Rahner's Foundations); for Aquinas the obediential potency is nature's openness to being used by the Creator as He wills. As a result of the differences, the Incarnation, for Rahner, can be deduced as a possibility from the very nature of man; for Thomas, even the possibility can only be known retrospectively once the Incarnation has happened. The different starting points reflect different epistemologies: the one starts from man's potentialities and moves out toward the world and God; the other works from the world and God to understand man's possibilities. Thus, for the Thomist " a posteriori reflection on the convenience " of the Incarnation there is substituted the Rahnerian " a priori reflection on the deducibility of the Incarnation " (p. 53). Without going deeply into a philosophical critique of Rahner-Cornelio Fabro has already done that-Ols con· tends that this difference is due to the fact that Rahner's theology " is radically dependent on an idealistic thought-pattern which represents a mortal danger for theology" (p. 56). E. Schillebeeckx's thought likewise suffers, says Ols, from the influence of philosophical idealism. What is central to Schillebeeckx's christology is the " concrete experience of the primitive Christian community " (p. 71, quoting Schillebeeckx's Jesus). Consequently, what we find in... (shrink)

In his recently published two-volume work in epistemology,1 Alvin Plantinga rounds out the discussion (in characteristic fashion) with a subtle and ingenious argument for a striking claim: in this case, his conclusion is that belief in evolutionary naturalism is irrational. Now this claim is not of itself so very surprising; the tantalizing feature here lies rather in the nature of the argument itself. Plantinga contends that taking seriously the hypothesis of evolutionary naturalism [hereafter, N&E] ought to undermine one's confidence in (...) the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties. And if one withholds belief in cognitive reliability, it seems that one ought to likewise refrain from believing propositions that are the output of such faculties. And, for evolutionary naturalists, one such output is belief in evolutionary naturalism itself. Hence, quite apart from comparative evidential considerations that might lead one to prefer theism (or one of its competitors) to N&E, but rather owing to a sort of internal inconsistency (in a suitably broad sense), belief in N&E is shown to be epistemically defective. A bold and intriguing suggestion indeed. Let us take a closer look. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 267-282 Skepticism and Philo's Atheistic Preference DAVID O'CONNOR [H]owever consistent the world may be... with the idea of... a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity... it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference.1 The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great (...) vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children. (DNR, 211) The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy. (DNR, 212) There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness, that they have perfect malice, that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice, that they have neither goodness nor malice.... The fourth... seems by far the most probable. (DNR, 212) David O'Connor is Professor of Philosophy, Seton Hall University, South Orange, New Jersey 07079. e-mail: [email protected] 268 David O'Connor What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme Being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good. (DNR, 212) Thus Philo in part 11 of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. I In the first of these passages, Philo is denying that the existence of "a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity" can justifiably be inferred from the facts of good and evil present to our experience. But power, wisdom, and benevolence are essential qualities of the God of traditional theism, thus Philo is here denying that the existence of such a being can justifiably be inferred from the empirical evidence of good and evil. The other passages show us Philo going further than this, indeed all the way to what seems to be a preference for moral atheism. The term is J. C. A. Gaskin's, and he defines it thus: "[moral atheism] will be [the position of] anyone who denies the existence of any god having moral attributes."2 In the second and third passages specifically, this prima facie preference is absolute ("[t]he whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature... without discernment" and "the original source of all things is entirely indifferent," respectively), while it is relative and more cautiously expressed in the fourth passage. And the fifth passage says at least as much as the first and perhaps as much as the second and third. Yet Philo very early in the book declares himself a skeptic on such metaphysical topics as "the origin of worlds" (DNR, 132), "the existence and properties of spirits" (DNR, 135), "the powers and operations of one universal spirit, existing without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite" (DNR, 135). The principal reason he gives is the "weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason... even in subjects of common life and practice" (DNR, 131). Considering these limits, surely it is very likely that "we have... got quite beyond the reach of our faculties" (DNR, 135) if and when we turn to such metaphysical topics as those he just listed. On these matters, which "run wide of common life... [t]he mind must remain in suspense... and it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of skepticism" (DNR, 135-6). Hume Studies Philo's Atheistic Preference 269 While the first of the passages I quoted in the beginning clearly squares with this skeptical outlook, and so does at least part of the fifth, it would seem that the rest of the quoted material does not... (shrink)

In recent years, as the enterprise of speculative metaphysics has attained a newfound measure of respectability, incompatibilist philosophers who are inclined to think that freedom of action is not only possible, but actual, have re-emerged to take on the formidable task of providing a satisfactory indeterministic account of the connections among an agent's freedom to do otherwise, her reasons, and her control over her act. In this paper, I want to examine three of these proposals, all of which give novel (...) twists to familiar themes. I will argue that despite the considerable ingenuity these philosophers evince, their attempts do not succeed. A common criticism of these theories will be that they fail to give a satisfactory account of what I term "agent-control," a certain feature of actions whose presence I take to be a central requirement for any workable model of responsible agency. I believe that the general notion I try to capture under this label is implicit in much of the voluminous discussion of the problem of free will (especially in compatibilist criticisms of libertarianism), although I am unaware of any explicit formulations of it in just the way I have in mind. Simply put, agent-control is that feature of the process of agency that accounts for how a particular piece of behavior is connected to, or an 'outflowing of, the agent, i.e., that which allows us properly to assert that the action was controlled by the agent. (shrink)

Longlisted for the PEN/E.O. Wilson Literary Science Writing Award A leading neuroscientist offers a history of the evolution of the brain from unicellular organisms to the complexity of animals and human beings today Renowned neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux digs into the natural history of life on earth to provide a new perspective on the similarities between us and our ancestors in deep time. This page-turning survey of the whole of terrestrial evolution sheds new light on how nervous systems evolved in (...) animals, how the brain developed, and what it means to be human. In The Deep History of Ourselves, LeDoux argues that the key to understanding human behavior lies in viewing evolution through the prism of the first living organisms. By tracking the chain of the evolutionary timeline he shows how even the earliest single-cell organisms had to solve the same problems we and our cells have to solve each day. Along the way, LeDoux explores our place in nature, how the evolution of nervous systems enhanced the ability of organisms to survive and thrive, and how the emergence of what we humans understand as consciousness made our greatest and most horrendous achievements as a species possible. (shrink)

Introduction Joseph Dunne, Attracta Ingram, Frank Litton This volume of essays has two main objectives: first, to pay tribute to Fergal O'Connor, ...

Justifying involuntary psychiatric treatment on the basis of a judgment that a person lacks capacity is usually expressed in terms of a person’s ability to make a decision about his or her health and treatment. Typically, this relates to the ability to refuse treatment. Exactly what “capacity” means, however, and how one determines when another individual lacks capacity, or lacks sufficient capacity, in this context is particularly controversial, with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities insisting (...) that involuntary treatment be abandoned altogether and capacity tests avoided.Capacity is a concept that has multiple meanings and applications across different disciplines and... (shrink)

The Morality of Happiness By Julia Annas, Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. x + 502. ISBN 0–19–507999‐X. £45.00 (hbk), £13.99 (pbk).Dimensions of Creativity By Margaret A. Boden (ed.) MIT Press, 1994. Pp. 242. ISBN 0–262–02368–7. £24.95.Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue By David Boonin‐Vail, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 219. ISBN 0–521–46209–6. £37.50.Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes By Quentin Skinner, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. 477. ISBN 0–521–55436–5. £35.00.Being and the Between By William Desmond, State (...) University of New York Press, 1995. Pp. 557. ISBN 0–7914–2271–2. $19.95.Perplexity and Ultimacy By William Desmond, State University of New York Press, 1995. Pp. 263. ISBN 0–7914–2387–5. $19.95.Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology By Susan Haack, Blackwell Publishers, 1994. Pp. x + 259. ISBN 0–631–19679‐X/£14.99 (pbk).Kant's Intuitionalism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic By Lorne Falkenstein, University of Toronto Press, 1996. Pp. xvii + 465. ISBN 0–8020–2973–6. $70.00.The Metaphysics of Free Will By John Martin Fischer, Blackwell, 1995. Pp. ix + 273. ISBN 1–55786–8573. £14.99.Identification Papers By Diana Fuss, Routledge, 1995. Pp. 179. ISBN 0–415–90886–8. $16.95.Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to his Critics Edited by Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., Vanderbilt University Press, 1995. ISBN 0–8265–1263–1 $24.95.Nietzsche's French Legacy: a Genealogy of Poststructuralism By Alan D. Schrift, Routledge, 1995. Pp. xviii + 198. ISBN 0–415–91146‐X. £40.00.Causal Cognition ‐ A Multidisciplinary Debate Edited by Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack, Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. 670. ISBN 0–19–852314–9. £00.00. (shrink)

In the late spring of 400 b.c.e., when the Ten Thousand were encamped outside the city of Cotyora, Xenophon addressed the soldiers gathered in assembly in order to defend himself against accusations that he was planning to lead them on a colonizing expedition to the land of the Phasis river. Having demonstrated that he was not misleading the soldiers by proving that he could not hope to deceive them into travelling east, Xenophon then moved on to what he presented as (...) a more serious matter for the assembled mercenaries: the problem of growing indiscipline in the army, and its consequences. Xenophon illustrated the extent of the problem by describing to the men two incidents in detail. (shrink)

Available in paperback for the first time, this landmark volume examines the course of Western philosophy over the past 2,500 years. A Critical History of Western Philosophy focuses on the most significant thinkers and philosophical movements while emphasizing key ideas of permanent interest and relevance. Arranged chronologically from early Greece to the twentieth century, this comprehensive work includes expert histories of all major figures from Socrates and Plato to G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and of every important school from the (...) Epicureans to the Existentialists. (shrink)